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JULIUS STONE AND THE ADVENTURE OF 
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 
L.F.E. Goldie* 
As a realist, Julius Stone notes that while men may speak and 
write in terms of absolute or a priori justice, effective justice must 
be limited by historical feasibility. As an idealist, he notes the real-
ity of justice in the lives of men and of political communities. 
Knowledgeable about the inwardness of the process of judicial deci-
sion, he has accepted the noncompulsive quality of legal logic. But, 
because he has placed limits on the "revolt against formalism," he 
accepts the legal order's ability to formulate its process of decision. 
Legal order achieves this through a creative rhetoric supplanting a 
barren logic. Finally, Julius Stone effectively answers the cynics 
who claim that judges indulge in self-deception, cadi justice, or the 
veiled exercise of repressive power. 
I. THE LIMITS OF REALIST JURISPRUDENCE 
The great contribution of the American Realist movement in 
jurisprudence was its participation in the more general "revolt 
against formalism" 1 which spread throughout the social sciences, 
but matured earliest in legal philosophy.2 The Realists' unique in-
sight began with Oliver Wendell Holmes's familiar but still ringing 
aphorisms that the "life of the law is not logic,"3 that the law "is 
not a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"4 in his recognition that 
the act of adjudication is creative5 and in his perception that at 
least part of lawyering is the prediction of probable future official 
behavior.6 
*Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse University 
College of Law. 
1. M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 11-13 (1949). 
2. Id. at 15-18, 59. 
3. 0. w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) [hereinafter cited as HOLMES]. 
4. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) . 
5. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 3, at 1. 
6. Justice Holmes's best-known formulation of this belief was: "[T]he prophecies of 
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 
0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920). This assertion 
should be read, however, in the light of Holmes's view that: 
It is not true that in practice (and I know no reason why they should disagree with 
the facts) a given word or even a given collocation of words has one meaning and no 
other. A word generally has several meanings, even in the dictionary. You have to 
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In tilting at the fallacy of "Bealism,"7 the Realists tended to go 
beyond the strictly necessary limits of their contribution. It is em-
pirically observable that trial courts have freedom of choice within 
the rules and that appellate courts have the power of reformulating 
old rules and developing new ones. These powers of choosing, re-
forming and reformulating may be written of as freedoms; they are 
also necessities. Society is in flux and so is law. But the flux of 
society is swifter than that of the law. Hence, the probability is that 
at any given moment of time any given portion of the law calls for 
re-examination. Secondly, the observable leeways in judicial deci-
sion stem from the lacunae between the inevitable particularity of 
the operative facts of a case and the generality of the rules which 
may be applied thereto. There are no rules for applying rules. 
Again, the nature of what materials in the process of decision 
are permitted to qualify for the definition of rules, and whether they 
are taken to be predictive, descriptive or prescriptive, determines 
the kind of functions that the observer will ascribe to them. Imman-
uel Kant's famous aphorism about the emptiness of disembodied 
thought and the blindness of observation without concepts still 
holds true. The world we live in is one of particulars; but we cannot 
grasp hold of it without our generalizations. 
Stone has brought to this dilemma two interrelated groups of 
tools. The first specifically reconciles the common-law theory of 
precedent with the creativity of judgment and the English judicial 
achievement. Through his analysis of the "fallacies" of the "logical 
form," he reviews both the deceptive appearances and the innova-
tive capabilities of the "main types of categories of illusory refer-
ence. "8 The second tool is his development of "the new rhetorics. " 9 
consider the sentence in which it stands in order to decide which of those meanings 
it bears in the particular case. 
The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203 (1920). 
7. After Professor Joseph H. Beale who, according to Jerome Frank (a leading exponent 
of Realism), viewed law as "UNIFORM, GENERAL, CONTINUOUS, EQUAL, CERTAIN, PURE" and consis-
ting of absolute, eternal and immutable principles. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 
48 (6th impression 1949). 
8. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 241-300 (1964) [hereinafter cited 
as STONE, LAWYERS' REASONINGS]. This volume is the first of a trilogy of books further develop-
ing the ideas and materials which their author first presented in THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION 
OF LAW (1961) [hereinafter cited as STONE, PROVINCE]. The other two volumes of the trilogy 
are: HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE (1965) [hereinafter cited as STONE, HUMAN JUSTICE]; 
and SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE (1966) [hereinafter cited as STONE, SOCIAL 
DIMENSIONS]. 
9. This is based on the work of Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, and others. 
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Stone's "main types of categories of illusory reference" serve as 
devices identifying the "secret and even unconscious exercise by 
courts of what in the ultimate analysis is a creative choice." 10 In the 
task of judging creatively, the premise on which a court's opinion 
may be founded may not yield any one answer by syllogistic reason-
ing, since the court is both invited and compelled to provide "an 
answer based on evaluation, conscious or unconscious, of the social 
situation confronting it." 11 The recognition of this process justifies 
Stone's significant distinction between "reasoning" and "reasons." 
Where formal logic ceases to be compelling, judicial decision is 
not, thereby, reduced to cadi justice. Stone gives meaning to this 
point by developing the implications of Karl Llewellyn's distinc-
tion 12 between the "Formal Style" and the "Grand Style," iden-
tifying the former with what he terms "legal formalism" or 
Begriffsjurisprudenz. Stone points out, however, that Llewellyn did 
not explicitly work through the implications of his concept of the 
"Grand Style" or the "Grand Manner"; nor did he identify com-
pletely how legal persuasion or justification should run within its 
terms. Stone remedies this shortfall by pointing out that the fuller 
understanding of judicial reasoning requires recognition of extra-
legal criteria upon which ~rucial choices may depend: the first is 
the question of justice; and the second, the social factors which in-
fluence and condition judicial choices in concrete instances. 
Stone accepts the legal reasoning of courts, in John Wisdom's 
terms, as being "like the legs of a chair, not the links of a chain." 13 
This leads him to investigate Perelman's "new rhetorics," a system 
which looks to the cooperation of elements in a persuasive demon-
stration in which they reinforce each other. The features of rhetori-
cal argument turn on agreement as to starting points, on persuasive-
ness, in terms of probability, of the theses that are developed there-
from, and on their mutual complimentarity. He writes: 
On the one hand, then, the conclusions of formal logical "proof" 
(as understood in modem times) may be formally valid, and yet not 
materially sound, since not corresponding to any external real-
ity .... On the other, rhetorical, non-stringent (or "quasi-logical") 
"proof' produces conclusions, which even though not formally valid 
10. STONE, LAWYERS' REASONINGS, supra note 8, at 241. 
11. Id. 
12. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960). 
13. J. WISDOM , Gods, in PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 149, 157 (1953). 
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may still be materially sound, in the sense of being worthy of reli-
ance in interpreting external reality. 14 
There is, of course, far more to rhetorics than psychological 
manipulation. They not only persuade, they are "persuasion-
worthy." The quality of persuasion-worthiness is measured by the 
mind of a man "capable of disciplined, reasoned, unbiased thinking, 
and concerned to discover what indeed should be held to be true on 
the given matter."15 This leads to the central problem. Too much 
cannot be expected from the new rhetorics. The problem of the 
audience remains. These forms of argument cannot, furthermore, 
provide judges and counsel with new techniques to fill the lacunae 
which the Realists have shown formal logic to imbed in the process 
of judicial decision. The new rhetorics are not an anodyne. They can 
help clarify thought and dignify persuasion. 
II. THE POWER OF JUSTICE 
The purpose of resort to reasoning, whether deductive, induc-
tive or "non-stringent," is to provide effectively persuasive argu-
mentation. Stone points out that Perelman's "theory of argumenta-
tion leaves the essential point of when the conclusion of non-
stringent reasoning is to be regarded as acceptable (or in his 
[Perelman's] word 'rational') in rather an impasse." 16 Perelman 
argues that "rationality" in his sense is measured by the worthiness 
of an argument to a universal audience of the totality of reasonable 
beings. In response to the criticism of circularity, Perelman escapes 
from the need to define the "universal" audience of "reasonable" 
men. He argues that ideas of justice arise from natural tendencies 
of the human mind and that this is "rational" behavior, "requiring 
no other justification" than to be behavior in accordance with "pre-
cedents. " 17 
It is ironic that the philosopher would appear to rely more heav-
ily on precedent than lawyers, and to be unable to indicate to the 
lawyer when precedents should not be followed at all "because they 
are unjust. " 18 Stone continues this criticism with the following tell-
ing point: 
14. STONE, LAWYERS' REASONINGS, supra note 8, at 330. 
15. Id. at 331. 
16. STONE, HUMAN JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 327. 
17. Perelman, La Regle de Justice, 14 DIALECTICA 230, 237 (1960), translated and empha-
sis added by Stone in STONE, HUMAN JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 328. 
18. Id. at 329. 
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To tell lawyers thus hungry for justice to keep to the rules or to 
the law, or to the precedents, guides them not a whit towards jus-
tice. It rather, indeed, seems to suggest that the justice they hunger 
for may be but an illusion. . . . If, indeed, the problem of justice 
for lawyers were one of keeping to the rules and precedents, it would 
be difficult to understand such views as that of Sir Patrick Devlin 
(as he was then) to the effect that "the just decision" always fluc-
tuates between "the law" and the aequum et bonum of the 
case .... 
. . . It is, indeed, surely a commonplace for lawyers that at any 
given time many rules of law are not even just as rules . So that even 
when we have found an indubitable rule, the conscientious lawyer 
may and sometimes should ask questions about the justice of it; 
just as, even when a rule is indubitably agreed to be just, there 
may be questions to ask about the justice of applying it in a case 
apparently within it. Such questions, asked by lawyers about law, 
cannot be answered by telling them to adhere to a rule, or to the 
law, or to a precedent. 19 
97 
The "new rhetoric" of Perelman may be helpful in developing 
a perceptive self-consciousness in legal analysis, and help sift out 
some of the unconscious biases that concerned Jerome Frank.20 It 
may also explain how lawyers have always been able to persuade, 
while not being imprisoned in a circuity which syllogistic reasoning 
might impose. But it does not adequately explain the means 
whereby justice can be imported into the process of judicial deci-
sion. 
Stone points to the weaknesses of both the modern utilitarians 
and John Rawls. He notes both their formalistic characters and 
their inability to pass from a set of individual rights to a pattern of 
social action which does not infringe those rights. Stone also adopts 
Charles Fried's criticism of Rawls; that is, if an individual "enters 
the situation of justice armed with (at least) this single interest, 
which he could not have won for himself by his own assertion, will 
his position in asserting any other interest for himself be defensi-
ble. " 21 Stone then tells us that, whatever the relation we may think 
ought to be established between fairness, equality and reciprocity, 
and between each of these and justice, the necessary presupposition 
of justice, namely the respect for the moral nature of every human 
19. Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added). 
20. See FRANK, supra note 7, at 30-34, 41-45, 108-26, 158-99, 283-306. 
21. Fried, Justice and Liberty, 6 NoMos (JUSTICE) 127, 141 (Friedrich and Chapman eds. 
1963). 
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personality, demands consideration of not only the objectively as-
certainable claims made by each individual, but also the conse-
quences for that individual, his fellows and the community, of the 
disposition of his and their claims. Modification of the principle of 
equality becomes unavoidable. On the one hand, equal treatment 
by the law operates on inequality of powers, talents and personal 
fortune. It would thus sanctify or intensify inequalities. On the 
other, the redirection of modification of factual inequalities calls 
for unequal treatment by the law. The dilemma hence becomes that 
of justifying, or even demanding for good reason, departures from 
equality. 
Stone's contribution to the quest for justice, and to resolution 
of the dilemmas its varying definitions create, are his "ideals which 
may be regarded as quasi-absolute precepts of justice in our own 
time . . . which we regard as indubitable for our generation of 
men."22 Because these ideals carry material content they cannot be 
regarded as absolutes in the Kantian sense. On the other hand, they 
may be experienced as absolute imperatives, insofar as "it is given 
to us, in our generation of humans, to know and act by abso-
lutes" .22·1 Hence their denomination as "quasi-absolutes" in the 
following terms: 
I. Social arrangements must leave everyone free to form and assert 
his own interests, treating every adult sane person as morally auton-
omous. 
II. The adjustment or shifting of advantages and burdens (includ-
ing rewards and punishments) for purposes of social control through 
law, should proceed in terms of the goods and evils of this world 
only. 
III. It is always incumbent on an actor to discover with maximum 
possible accuracy all aspects of the situation in which he acts or fails 
to act. 
IV. Generally all action should respect the principle ofreciprocity 
between persons. 
V. Generally all action should respect the principle of equality 
between persons. 
VI. Generally any serious invasions of the socially approved distri-
bution of advantages should be met by the grant of appropriate 
remedies for the persons injured. 
VII. Generally contributions to socially approved arrangements 
shall be acknowledged, and where appropriate shall be rewarded, by 
22. STONE, HUMAN JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 341. 
22.1. Id. 
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protective immunities or otherwise. 
VIII. Generally any serious infringements of socially accepted val-
ues, or invasions of the socially approved distribution of advantages, 
shall be manifestly disapproved, where appropriate by the meting 
out of punishment. 
IX. Punishment shall not always respect the human dignity of the 
offender, and shall in any case not exceed reasonable proportionality 
to the offence.23 
99 
Stone envisions these "quasi-absolute precepts of justice" as 
constituting the core values of historically won "enclaves of jus-
tice"24 existing in particular societies at particular times. Beyond 
the hard-core values Stone sees a penumbra! area where justice 
still contends with ever resurgent barbarism, cruelty, suffering, 
despair and nihilism. Beyond the penumbra is the outer wilderness 
where man is still homo homini lupus. The hard-won enclaves re-
flect a consensus of values socially, and their internalization in the 
minds of individual citizens. Such enclaves reflect alliances and 
interactions of basic values. They are constituted by complexes of 
attitudes, roles, expectations, values, institutional arrangements 
and community activities. From the standpoint of an observer, 
these complexes are empirically observable facts, while within 
the group they produce norms and are thus seen in terms of obli-
gation. The stress, as Stone sees it, is not upon the theories of 
justice, but on their emanations in just conduct and institutions. 
Furthermore, the enclaves are not to be seen as substitutes for 
such theories. They (the theories of justice) may, even when com-
peting, both explain currently held enclaves and provide the 
basis of the extension of the enclaves into penumbra! or unstable 
regions. 
Stone has not used the metaphor of "enclaves of justice" to 
offer any kind of a conclusion regarding theories of justice. Its utility 
is, first, to offer a perspective of W estem history; second, to point 
to the important act of commitment to justice as a basic value; and 
third, to offer a connecting link between human theories and the 
human condition. Far from arguing a "Hegelian" thesis of the inevi-
table unfolding of ethics and justice, he points to the need for con-
stantly appraising the interaction of ideas and experience. In this 
vein, he emphasizes the possibility of degeneration and backsliding. 
Stone's metaphor of enclaves thus stresses the fragility of ideals 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 344-45. 
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in the hurly-burly of history and the need for their constant reaffir-
mation and reappraisal. It also strikingly recalls A.N. Whitehead's 
reminder to philosophers: 
The concept of Civilization, as developed up to this stage, re-
mains inherently incomplete. No logical argument can demonstrate 
this gap. Such arguments are merely subsidiary helps for the con-
scious realization of metaphysical intuitions - Non in dialectica 
complacuit Dea salvum facere populum suum. This saying, quoted 
by Cardinal Newman should be the motto of every metaphysician.25 
Ill. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ENCLAVE OF 
JUSTICE? 
Surveying the significance of the increasing economic interde-
pendence of nations and concluding that the more developed states 
have an unconditional duty to help assure a minimum standard of 
human subsistence, Stone argues that this duty cannot be dis-
charged simply by the ordinary processes of trade. He writes: 
If a "world economic interest" could be postulated, its pursuit would 
have to be largely not by trade but by the operation of a world 
"grants economy." And we would here make explicit the vital rider 
that useful directives for such a "grants economy" cannot be drawn 
from the notions of either "world economic interest" or "interde-
pendence", unless we recognize the kind of justice imperative im-
posed by history on the relations of the more developed to most of 
the newer states. 26 
This "imperative" of international justice to respect claims for 
a general minimal subsistence would provide psychological incen-
tives for consolidating an international "justice-constituency."27 
Such an emergent constituency has its analogies in the national 
justice-constituencies of the developed countries whch already pro-
vide the moral and psychological bases for the transfer of wealth 
domestically. There the precedent has become both effectively in-
ternalized in the individual members of the national community 
and democratically institutionalized in its life. Having pointed to 
the analogies between national and international justice-
25. A. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF lDEAS 380 (1933). 
26. J. STONE, APPROACHES TO THE NOTION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 79 (Truman Center 
Publications, No. 4, 1970) [hereinafter cited as STONE, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE] (footnotes 
omitted). 
27. For a discussion of the constituencies of justice see STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra 
note 8, at 796-98. 
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constituencies, Stone marks the differences. Above all there is the 
directness of the mutuality of benefit and sacrifice within a national 
community. In the present state of world affairs this may be con-
trasted with the diffuse and long-term character of such a mutual-
ity in the international community. Stone sees the growth of inter-
national justice as an enclave pioneered from the values of national 
constituencies. As the concern for a world-wide minimum level of 
subsistence grows, so the task of developing international institu-
tions reflecting both the concern and the precept becomes a more 
hopeful one. An institutionalization of the precept of minimal sub-
sistence provides a more effective basis of distributive justice than 
could bilateral agreements with their concerns of power politics, and 
a more convincing means for internalizing that precept as a transna-
tional moral value in the consciousness of ordinary citizens. 
In developing the theory of an emergent international enclave 
of justice, Stone seeks to suggest alternative arguments regarding 
assistance to the developing communities of mankind which could 
Interrelate the mutual compassion of peoples and long-term politi-
cal and economic prudence. His thesis gives concreteness to notions 
of what is feasible, rather than what is ideal, in international eco-
nomic justice. He concludes his study with the following insight: 
Whether in warning or in hope, we need to go beyond the formula-
tions of a merely conceivable notion of international economic jus-
tice. We need also to address ourselves, as has here been attempted, 
to questions of feasibility in terms of living societies of men and their 
leaders as we know them, and as they can be expected to develop. 
For by whatever approach, men can move forward only from where 
they are. 28 
In his insight into the emergent international constituency of 
justice, Stone has triumphantly steered between the Scylla of for-
malism, to which so many important international projects have 
fallen prey, and the Charybdis of subjectivism, whose power can be 
seen in the United Nations General Assembly. 
28. STONE, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 89 (footnotes omitted). 
11
Goldie: Idea of Justice
Published by SURFACE, 1975
